Michael Blome-Tillmann

McGill Philosophy ~ Cambridge Philosophy

Talks


2016

  • 'Sensitivity Actually', European Epistemology Network Meeting EENM 2016, Paris EHESS, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (July 2016).
  • 'Knowledge First and the Paradox of the Gatecrasher', Leuven Epistemology Conference, University of Leuven, Belgium (December 2016).
  • 'The Paradox of the Gatecrasher', Department of Philosophy, University of Stirling, Scotland (December 2016).
  • 'The Paradox of the Gatecrasher', Pervasive Context Conference, Department of Philosophy, University of Reading, UK (June 2016).
  • 'The Paradox of the Gatecrasher', Balliol College, Oxford, UK (March 2016).
  • 'On the Role of Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law', Serious Metaphysics Group, Department of Philosophy, Cambridge University (March 2016).
  • 'On the Role of Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law', Department of Philsoophy, King's College, London (Feb 2016).

2015

  • 'Safety and Sensitivity – A Troublesome Example and a Solution', Southern California Epistemology Workshop, University of California, Irvine (April 2015).
  • More Likely Than Not – Modal Epistemology, Knowledge First, and the Role of Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law', Department of Philosophy, University of California at Riverside (April 2015).
  • 'On Denoting and Referring', Moral Sciences Club, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Cambridge (March 2015).

2014

  • 'Statistical Evidence and Knowledge First', Conference on Statistical Evidence in Epistemology and the Law, Glasgow University (Dec. 2014).
  • 'Knowledge First and the Problem of Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law', University of Edinburgh, Department of Philosophy (Epistemology Group), Edinburgh, UK (October 2014).
  • 'On the Role of Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law', Universite de Montreal, GRIN - Groupe de Recherche Interuniversitaire sur la Normativite, Montreal, Canada (September 2014).
  • 'Lotteries and the Modal Conception of Knowledge', European Epistemology Network Meeting EENM 2014, Madrid (June/July 2014).
  • 'Lotteries and the Modal Conception of Knowledge', Workshop on Knowledge and Language, KU-Leuven, Belgium (April 2014).
  • ‘Solving the Moorean Puzzle’, Stockholm University, Department of Philosophy (April 2014).
  • ‘Solving the Moorean Puzzle’, National University of Singapore, Department of Philosophy (April 2014).
  • ‘Solving the Moorean Puzzle’, Kyoto University, Department of Philosophy and History of Science (March 2014).
  • 'Lotteries and the Modal Conception of Knowledge', Nanyang Technological University, Singapore (April 2014).
  • 'Lotteries and the Modal Conception of Knowledge', Yonsei University, Department of Philosophy, Seoul, Korea (March 2014).
  • 'Lotteries and the Modal Conception of Knowledge', Universität zu Köln, Department of Philosophy (Jan. 2014)

2013

  • ‘Solving the Moorean Puzzle’, New Perspectives on External World Scepticism (Workshop) - LMU Munich, (July 2013).
  • ‘Solving the Moorean Puzzle’, Conférences Hugues Leblanc, Université du Québec à Montréal, Department of Philosophy (October 2013).

2012

  • ‘Solving the Moorean Puzzle’, Department Colloquium, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg (Nov. 2012).
  • ‘Solving the Moorean Puzzle’, Open Session of the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association, Stirling (July 2012).
  • ‘Solving the Moorean Puzzle’, Workshop of the European Epistemology Network, Bologna (June 2012).

2011

  • ‘The Simple View of Epistemic Justification', Universität zu Köln, Department of Philosophy (Dec. 2011)
  • ‘The Simple View of Epistemic Justification’, Canadian Society for Epistemology 2011 Symposium--Epistemic Norms (Nov. 2011).

2010

  • ‘Epistemic Justification and Safe Reliability’, Group de Recherche Interuniversitaire sur la Normativité, Université de Montreal (Nov. 2010).
  • ‘Epistemic Justification and Safe Reliability’, Universität zu Köln, Department of Philosophy (Dec. 2010).
  • ‘A Dual-Layer Semantics for Definite Descriptions’, Centre for Logic & Analytical Philosophy – Formal Epistemology Project, Leuven (June 2010).
  • ‘Presuppositional Epistemic Contextualism and the Problem of Retrospective Knowledge Attributions’, Arché Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics & Epistemology Workshop on Knowledge Ascriptions, St Andrews (Oct. 2010).
  • ‘Knowledge and Presuppositions’, Beijing Normal University, Beijing (May 2010).
  • ‘A Dual-Layer Semantics for Definite Descriptions’, The Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference – Reference and Referring, University of Idaho in Moscow, Idaho, and Washington State University in Pullman, Washington (Mar. 2010).

2009

  • ‘Non-Cognitivism and the Grammar of Morality’, The Aristotelian Society, London (June 2009).
  • ‘Knowledge and Implicatures’, New Trends in the Study of Implicatures, KU Leuven (Dec. 2009).

2008

  • ‘Non-Cognitivism and the Grammar of Morality’, University of Manchester, Department of Philosophy (Oct. 2008).
  • ‘Knowledge and Presuppositions’, McGill University, Department of Philosophy, (Feb. 2008).
  • ‘Knowledge and Presuppositions’, University of California at Irvine, Department of Philosophy, (Feb. 2008).

2007

  • ‘Do One’s Practical Interests Influence What One Knows?', University of Leeds, Department of Philosophy, (Sept. 2007).
  • ‘Epistemic Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism, and the Interaction of‘Knowledge’-Ascriptions with Modal Operators’, Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society & Mind Association, Bristol, (July 2007).
  • ‘Knowledge and Pragmatic Presuppositions’, Context-Dependence, Perspective and Relativity in Language and Thought, Paris, (November 2007).
  • ‘Knowledge and Pragmatic Presuppositions’, International Conference on Linguistics and Epistemology, Aberdeen, (May 2007).

2006

  • ‘Contextualism and the Epistemological Enterprise’, Graduate Session at the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society & Mind Association,Southampton, (July 2006).
  • ‘Contextualism and the Epistemological Enterprise’, Philosophy: Foundations and Applications – GAP6, Berlin, (Sept. 2006).
  • ‘Contextualism and the Epistemological Enterprise’, Congress of the Italian Society of Analytic Philosophy – SIFA 2006, Milan, (Sept. 2006).

2005

  • ‘Epistemic Contextualism and the Error-Theory Objection’, The 13th Annual Harvard-MIT Graduate Student Philosophy Conference, MIT (Mar. 2005). (Response by Eric Swanson).
  • ‘Epistemic Contextualism and the Error-Theory Objection’, Arche Graduate Conference in the Philosophy of Logic, Language, Mathematics and Mind, University of St Andrews (Feb. 2005). (Response by Carrie Jenkins).
  • ‘Epistemic Contextualism and the Error-Theory Objection’, National Postgraduate Analytic Philosophy Conference 2005, University of York (July 2005). (Response by Simon Langford).
  • ‘A Closer Look at Closure Scepticism’, Institut Jean Nicod & Sorbonne, Paris IV, Epistemology Workshop, (May 2005).
  • ‘A Closer Look at Closure Scepticism’, Graduate Session at the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society & Mind Association, University of Manchester, (July 2005).
  • ‘A Closer Look at Closure Scepticism’, Fifth European Congress for Analytic Philosophy – ECAP5, University of Lisbon, (August 2005).
  • ‘Can Truth Be Defined?’, Congress of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology (ESPP 2005), Lund University, Sweden (August 2005).
  • ‘Can Truth Be Defined?’, Varieties of Analysis: Conceptions of Analysis in the History of Philosophy, St Catherine’s College, Oxford (Mar. 2005).

2004

  • ‘Frege on Sentences and Proper Names’, 2nd National Congress of the Portuguese Society for Analytic Philosophy, Porto (Oct. 2004).

2003

  • ‘Where Sceptical Invariantism Goes Wrong’, GAP5: Philosophy, Science, Scientific Philosophy, Bielefeld (Sept. 2003).
  • ‘Foundationalism and Coherentism From A Contextualist Point of View’, 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg, Austria (Aug. 2003).