Michael Blome-Tillmann

McGill Philosophy



  1. Knowledge and Presuppositions, Oxford University Press (2014).
    • Available from OUP UK and OUP USA.
    • Reviews:
      • NDPR: "oustanding", "a must read", "a seriously excellent book".
      • ANALYSIS: "dense", "impressive", "illuminating".
      • Philosophical Review: "ambitious", "very good", "clear and illuminating".
  2. The Semantics of Knowledge Attributions, Oxford University Press (under contract).

Journal Articles

  1. Statistical Evidence, Normalcy, and the Gatecrasher Paradox, in: Mind (forthcoming).
  2. Subject-Sensitive Invariantism, High-Stakes/Low-Stakes Cases, and Presupposition Suspension, in: Episteme (forthcoming).
  3. What Shifts Epistemic Standards? DeRose on Contextualism, Safety, and Sensitivity', in: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism (forthcoming).
  4. Non-Reductive Safety, in: Belgrade Philosophical Annual (forthcoming).
  5. Sensitivity Actually, in: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94(3): 606-624 (2017).
  6. Sensitivity, Causality, and Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law, in: Thought 4/2 (2015), pp. 102-112.
  7. Ignorance, Presuppositions, and the Simple View, in: Mind 124/496 (2015), pp. 1221-1230.
  8. Counter Closure and Knowledge despite Falsehood, in: Philosophical Quarterly 64/257 (2014), pp. 552-568 (with Brian Ball).
  9. Solving the Moorean Puzzle, in: Philosophical Studies 172/2 (2015), pp. 493-514.
  10. Knowledge and Implicatures, in: Synthese 190/18 (2013), pp. 4293-4319.
  11. Indexical Reliabilism and the New Evil Demon, in: Erkenntnis 78/6 (2013, pp. 1317-1336 (with Brian Ball).
  12. Contextualism and the Knowledge Norms, in: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94/1 (2013), pp. 89–100.
  13. Conversational Implicatures (and How to Spot Them), in: Philosophy Compass 8/2 (2013), pp. 170-185.
  14. Knowledge and Presuppositions, in: Mind 118/470 (2009), pp. 241-294.
  15. Non-Cognitivism and the Grammar of Morality, in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109/1 (2009), pp. 279-309.
  16. Contextualism, Safety and Epistemic Relevance, in: Philosophical Studies 143/3 (2009), pp. 383-394.
  17. Epistemic Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Interaction of 'Knowledge'-Ascriptions with Modal and Temporal Embeddings, in: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79/2 (2009), pp. 315-331.
  18. Conversational Implicature and the Cancellability Test, in: Analysis 68/298 (2008), pp. 156-160.
  19. The Indexicality of 'Knowledge', in: Philosophical Studies 138/1 (2008), pp. 29-53.
  20. The Folly of Trying to Define Knowledge, in: Analysis 67/295 (2007), pp. 214-219.
  21. Contextualism and the Epistemological Enterprise, in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, CVII (2007), pp. 387-394.
  22. A Closer Look at Closure Scepticism, in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, CVI (2006), pp. 383-392.

Book Chapters

  1. Knowledge as Contextual, in: Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy: The Philosophy of Knowledge: A History Volume IV, Stephen Hetherington & Markos Valaris (eds.), London: Bloomsbury Academic: 175-194 (2018).
  2. Skepticism and Contextualism, in: Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present, ed. by Baron Reed & Diego Manchuca, New York/London: Bloomsbury: 620-634 (2018).
  3. 'More Likely Than Not' - Knowledge First and the Role of Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law, in: Knowledge First - Approaches in Epistemology and Mind, Adam Carter, Emma Gordon, & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press: 278-292 (2017).
  4. Gradability and Knowledge, in: Routledge Handbook on Epistemic Contextualism, ed. by Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, Routledge: 348-357 (2017).
  5. Ignorance and Epistemic Contextualism, in: The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance, Martijn Blaauw & Rik Peels (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2016), pp. 96-113.
  6. Presuppositional Epistemic Contextualism and the Problem of Known Presuppositions, in: Knowledge Ascriptions, ed. by Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken, Oxford University Press: (2012), pp. 104-119.

Articles in Conference Proceedings

  1. Frege on Sentences and Proper Names, in: Analyses – Proceedings of the 2nd National Meeting for Analytic Philosophy, Porto, Universidad de Porto (2006), pp. 35-41.
  2. What’s Wrong With Sceptical Invariantism?, in: Roland Bluhm and Christian Nimtz (eds.), Selected Papers Contributed to GAP.5, Fifth International Congress of the Society for Analytic Philosophy. Paderborn: mentis (2003), pp. 157-68.
  3. Coherentism and Foundationalism From A Contextualist Point of View, in: W. Loeffler and P. Weingartner, eds., Knowledge and Belief. Papers of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg am Wechsel (2003), pp. 42-43.